Brain Perspectives on Investor Behavior
and Decision-Making Errors
Owen D. Jones*
INTRODUCTION
I want to start off with what I consider to be the statement of the
problem. As I understand it, you’re concerned that the time horizons for
maximizing the value of an investment vary among individuals in
surprisingly wide, imperfectly predictable, and often seemingly irrational
ways. And, if I understand your target here, the idea is that a deeper
understanding of the causes of this variation might aid in the planning and
design of legal and corporate policies.
To jump into this, I’m going to give a little bit of an introduction
about behavioral biases, and something that I’ve called “time-shifted
rationality.”1 I’ll then back up to provide some basic context about where
behavior comes from, from a brain science perspective, and then talk about
two key things. First: Why does the brain discount time? Second: How
does the brain discount time? I’ll then spend a few minutes, toward the
end, talking about prospects for interdisciplinary consilience, in
furtherance of a more accurate and robust model of time discounting.

* New York Alumni Chancellor’s Professor of Law & Professor of Biological Sciences, Vanderbilt
University; Director, MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience. This is a
lightly edited transcript of a Keynote Lecture delivered at the Berle IX Symposium: Investor Time
Horizons, at Georgia State University on June 5, 2017. My thanks to Anne Tucker and the symposium
participants for stimulating conversations. Jessica Haushalter provided able research assistance. Preparation of this work was supported, in part, by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation.
1. Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral
Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. L. REV. 1141 (2001) [hereinafter Time-Shifted
Rationality]. See Owen D. Jones, Why Behavioral Economics Isn’t Better, and How It Could Be, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Joshua Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler
eds., forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Why Behavioral Economics], and Owen D. Jones & Timothy H.
Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005), for further discussion in
this vein.
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CONTEXT
There’s a vast territory of relevant brain science one could cover
here. And time is short. So, let me just jump in with an example that may
help to illustrate some key points.
As a child, I was very intrigued by animal behavior and had a passion
fueled in equal measure by available forests and books. When I was about
ten years old, I was out one afternoon trying to record the songs of a very
charismatic mockingbird that had taken up a post on top of a telephone
pole.
But the recordings became less interesting, in light of a fascinating
pattern in the bird’s more flamboyant behavior. When a crow flew about
twenty-five feet over the pole, I noticed, the mockingbird would reliably
leap up into the air and give an aggressive wing-waving display, which
appeared to encourage the crow to move on.
Biologists call such behavior “adaptive,” because (in part) it reduces
the chances the crows will eat mockingbird eggs or chicks. Separately,
economists might call this behavior “rational,” not because the bird is
cogitating at a high level, but because of (in part) the tight logical
connection between the presumed goal and the outcome.2
But here’s the key point for our present purpose. It soon became
obvious that when a plane of the same apparent aspect as the crow (though
much higher, in reality) flew overhead, the bird displayed against the plane
just as rigorously as it did against the crow.
Not surprisingly, the plane didn’t care. And, equally unsurprisingly,
it sped away. Tragically, though, this bird would display hour after hour,
chasing away plane after plane, in what could only be an enormously
wasteful burning of hard-fought calories. This, then, we might call
“irrational,” because expensive behavior provides no actual payoff.
Now here’s what I want to suggest. The irrationality of the
mockingbird in displaying against the plane was not randomly irrational,
but rather irrational in a very, very specific way. It reflects a concept I’ve
called “time-shifted rationality.”3 And the essential idea is that there’s a
subset of irrationalities in which a mismatch occurs between evolved
information processing features of the brain, on one hand, and the novel
features of the modern environment, on the other.
2. There’s more to it, of course. See GEORGE WILLIAMS, ADAPTATION AND NATURAL
SELECTION: A CRITIQUE OF SOME CURRENT EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT (1966), for a classic
treatment.
3. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality, supra note 1. In some fields this concept goes by the term
“mismatch theory,” RANDOLPH M. NESSE & GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, WHY WE GET SICK: THE NEW
SCIENCE OF DARWINIAN MEDICINE (1st ed. 1996), or “ecological rationality,” PETER M. TODD &
GERD GIGERENZER, ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY: INTELLIGENCE IN THE WORLD (2012).
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That’s really the key thing: a mismatch between an evolved feature
of the brain and the modern environment in which the brain finds itself.
And that can make some behavioral predispositions that have evolved as
adaptations situationally irrational and puzzling.
If you look around, you’ll realize that we’re often surrounded by
time-shifted rationalities. If you think about a moth circling a street light
at night, it’s not because the moths are engaged in some sort of weird,
randomly irrational behavior. It’s because their nervous systems evolved,
in a time without electricity, to navigate by moonlight and star light. In the
same way, a part of my human brain wants to diet in the morning, while
another part prompts me to reach for the ice cream at night. When I do,
I’m surely being irrationally inconsistent with what I think of as my
overarching, more authentic goal. But I’m not being randomly irrational.
I have a brain that evolved in an environment that lacked such an
extraordinary concentration of fats and calories that one could, actually,
consume them to the point of adverse health consequences. Put another
way: Until quite recently (on an evolutionary time scale) there simply
wasn’t such a readily available concentration of calories as the modern
environment now provides. The reason sweets and fats are so enjoyable to
us is because of their adaptive significance. Because consuming sweets
and fats (when we could get them) historically enabled us to store energy
in our body that we could use at a later time.
What I want to suggest, similarly, is that the relationship between our
evolved brain and our financial investments is in large measure a timeshifted rationality. We can cognitively control some of our investment
behavior by reflecting on it, and becoming educated about it. But our basic
behavioral predispositions are encountering novel environmental features.
And the result of that encounter will often lead to some weird outcomes in
the modern era.
I have previously argued that behavioral cognitive biases of this
sort—which include not only intertemporal choice anomalies, but also
framing effects, anchoring affects and (something I’ll be coming back to
later) endowment effects—may all be linked subsurface by time-shifted
rationality.4 That is, to an evolutionary side-effect that today inclines us
toward these quite patterned deviations from rational behavior.
BEHAVIORAL BIOLOGY, THE BRAIN, AND NATURAL SELECTION
With that as a background and context, let’s talk about where
behavior comes from. The basic context is quite simple. Humans are
animals. Animals are zero sum choice machines. That is, they can’t do
4. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality, supra note 1.

352

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 41:349

everything at the same time, and whatever they do comes at the cost of
what they aren’t doing.
Animals can eat, sleep, forage, mate, and (in one species) even write
law review articles. But typically not all at the same time. Animal choice
patterns, which shape their behaviors, are influenced by both brain form
and brain function. And both of those are in turn shaped by two things: (1)
evolutionary processes operating across evolutionary time scales; and (2)
the experiences of each organism across its life.
For present purposes, we can consider there to be three key fields in
behavioral biology. One is evolutionary biology. Another is cognitive
neuroscience. And a third is behavioral genetics. In the short time
available, I’ll only be able to touch on the first two of those three.
Now before doing that, and by way of preface, I could spend our
whole hour deprograming what are probably some biases you may have
about what behavioral biology entails.5 Some of you (hopefully, not many
of you) might think: “Ah ha! I see where this is going. Jones is about to
talk about ‘hardwiring,’—or genes that are ‘for,’ in some concrete way, a
specific behavior. And I already know that will all be deterministic and
reductionist, and will somehow suggest that behavior originates from
some antonym for ‘learned’ or ‘culturally influenced.’”
In fact, none of that is true at all. Behavioral biology just doesn’t
operate in that strawman sort of way. What it does do is say this: Look,
arguing about whether or not genes or environment drive a behavior is like
arguing about whether it’s the length of a rectangle or its width that
determines its area.6
That’s nonsensical. Similarly, brains exist at the intersection of genes
and environments, as these things play out together across long periods of
evolutionary time. We now know, in a way we didn’t a hundred years ago,
that the brain is anatomically and functionally specialized and that it
operates in a way that nonrandomly associates suites of environmental
inputs with, generally speaking, nudges in the direction of behavioral
outputs that were adaptive, on average, in ancestral environments.
And it does so with neurons that number approximately eighty-six
billion.7 Many of them have a thousand synapses to other neurons.8 And
although the brain is only two percent of the body’s mass, it consumes a
5. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 484–99.
6. This apt metaphor is typically attributed to renowned psychologist Donald Hebb, during a
question and answer session following a public lecture. See, e.g., Michael J. Meaney, The Nature of
Nurture: Maternal Effects and Chromatin Remodeling, in ESSAYS IN SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 1 (John
T. Cacioppo & Gary Berntson eds., 2004).
7. SUZANA HERCULANO-HOUZEL, THE HUMAN ADVANTAGE: A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF HOW
OUR BRAIN BECAME REMARKABLE 216 (2016).
8. Id. at 22.
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disproportionate amount of energy—roughly twenty percent.9 So it’s a
very hungry furnace, notwithstanding the fact that it runs—most
remarkably—on barely twenty-four watts of power.10
Now, many of you have probably heard of, or know a little bit about,
“natural selection.” But I want to focus for a moment on the key
components of it. It’s the logical outcome, in fact the necessary outcome,
of any system that involves the following three components: (1)
replication (in other words heredity); (2) variation in that replication
(whether it’s through mutation, sexual recombination, genetic drift, or
gene flow); and (3) differential reproduction of the organisms that bear
those traits, as a function of the effects those traits have on reproductive
success.11
Anytime you have those three things, you must, as a consequence,
have natural selection. Which some people think of as a process, but which
might perhaps be more intuitively framed as the description of an
inevitable outcome.
Heritable traits that increase reproductive success more than do
contemporary traits appearing elsewhere in a population tend to grow in
their proportional representation within future generations. That is to say:
the progeny and traits of organisms that reproduce more will become
increasingly prevalent in the world, over time, than the progeny and traits
of organisms that reproduce less. So powerful is the compounding effect
of this winnowing of traits that are out-competed in the reproductive game
that most species that ever existed have gone extinct. And most organisms
that ever exist die without offspring.
TIME
At this point, we need to talk about evolutionary time for just a
moment, so we can understand the scale involved here. Think for a
moment about the difference between having one dollar in your bank
account, on one hand, and having ninety million dollars in your account,
on the other. When you think about that ratio, know that that’s roughly the
same ratio between the period representing your own life on this planet
and the entire period during which evolutionary processes have been
shaping the form and behavior of life on Earth. So it’s essential to

9. Marcus E. Raichle, Cognitive Neuroscience: Bold Insights, 412 NATURE, July 12, 2001, at
128, 128.
10. Herculano-Houzel, supra note 7, at 173.
11. See JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR (10th ed., 2013) and TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH &
WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN NATURE (2001), for general
introductions.
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recognize that we’re talking about vast periods of time, during which even
the smallest of differences can have enormous long-term effects.
Another way of thinking about the time scale is this. Consider as one
unit the time counted backward from now to Year 1 of the modern
calendar. That is, roughly two thousand years. How many multiples of that
unit do you think you would need in order to reach back through time to
our first primate ancestor?
The answer is roughly thirty-five thousand. Put another way, we’re
thirty-five thousand times as far from our first primate ancestor (which is
of course not even our first mammalian ancestor) as we are from the year
1 A.D. Natural selection has had long periods of time to work with.
THE PROXIMATE/ULTIMATE DISTINCTION
I need to pause here to emphasize the essential distinction between
two very different kinds of causes. Biologists call them (not all that
helpfully, I admit) “ultimate causation” and “proximate causation.”12
These are terms of art in biology, notwithstanding the fact that the terms
are also used in both legal and lay conversations alike.
The core distinction is this. “Proximate causes” are those immediate
mechanistic pathways that describe how something comes to happen.
These are often described in neuroanatomical and morphological ways.
“Ultimate causes” are the historical and evolutionary pathways by which
a given physical or behavioral feature came to be common in a species in
the first place. They are the why causes.
Why is it important to emphasize this distinction? Because these two
very different kinds of causes are commonly lumped together as if they
are somehow in necessary tension. They are not. They’re complementary.
They’re two sides of the same coin, if you will.
To give an example, suppose one were to ask “Why does this song
sparrow sing in the spring?” You could begin to answer by stating this:
The lengthening of the day has triggered hormonal changes in the bird’s
brain, which caused motor neurons in the bird brain to activate muscles
surrounding the lungs, in ways that cause the lungs to constrict, in ways
that cause air to pass over particularly shaped vocal cords—and voilà,
sound ensues.
Well, that’s all right, so far as it goes. But it doesn’t go far enough.
It doesn’t answer the two component questions: (1) Why is the bird singing
instead of jumping up and down or running around in a circle? And (2)
12. See ALCOCK, supra note 11; GOLDSMITH & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 11; John Alcock &
Paul Sherman, The Utility of the Proximate-Ultimate Dichotomy in Ethology, 96 ETHOLOGY 58
(1994); Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 454–57; Ernst Mayr, Cause and Effect in Biology, 134
SCI., Nov. 10, 1961, at 1501, 1501.
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Why is the bird singing in the spring, rather than in, say, the depths of
winter?
To answer these questions, you have to think about ultimate
causation. In the context of this example, the evolutionary hypothesis is
pretty well-established. If you are a songbird, then singing advertises your
existence, your attractiveness, and your robustness—not only to potential
mates—but also to potential rivals.13 This is thought to result from the fact
that singing is very difficult to maintain under a heavy parasite load or
weak physical condition.14 It’s basically advertising: “I’m great, come
have sex with me. And, if you’re the same sex as I am, don’t mess with
me, or mess around in my territory.”
But why sing in the spring? Because if you randomly distributed,
across the year, predispositions to sing at any old time of the year, the best
time to mate and raise offspring is when food is abundant and conditions
aren’t harsh. That’s the spring. So those birds that try to raise offspring in
the winter left fewer offspring. As did those not inclined to start until late
summer or the fall. And when we look around today, we’re left with the
descendants of what’s left over—which were birds carrying heritable
predispositions to sing and to mate and to raise offspring in the spring,
when temperatures are mild and food is becoming steadily abundant.
So, some key points about the basic context here. Species evolve
within particular environmental circumstances, not in anticipation of
future ones. The brain has evolved to function within those particular
circumstances. Brain adaptations manifest not only in the structure of the
brain, but also in the way it nudges behavioral outcomes. Natural selection
has favored behavioral predispositions that maximize reproductive returns
given the long prevalent environmental circumstances. Evolved
predispositions are frequently conditional. And rapid environmental
change can yield mismatch.
And that may be why, ultimately, human brains sometimes act
weirdly when discounting investments across time.
TIME AND THE BRAIN
So why does the brain discount time at all? We can raise the
hypothesis that the brain discounts time—from an ultimate, evolutionary

13. Stephen Nowicki & William A. Searcy, Song Function and the Evolution of Female
Preferences: Why Birds Sing, Why Brains Matter, 1016 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 704 (2004).
14. See, e.g., Linda L. Bischoff, Barbara Tschirren, Heinz Richner, Long-Term Effects of Early
Parasite Exposure on Song Duration and Singing Strategy in Great Tits, 20 BEHAV. ECOLOGY 265
(2009); Buchanan, K.L., C.K. Catchpole, J.W. Lewis, et al., Song as an Indicator of Parasitism in the
Sedge Warbler, 57 ANIMAL BEHAV. 307 (1999).
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cause perspective—because in deep primate and hominid history we long
encountered the following environmental features.
The average lifespan was much shorter than it is today. Our ancestors
were also less likely to reach the maximum lifespan, than you are to
approach it (at least in high-wealth countries) in the modern era. Also,
trade was quite risky. Why? Because our deep ancestors had no robust
enforcement mechanisms. Secure rights were limited to what you had in
your hand (if you were lucky) or to what you could store around your belly
through immediate consumption. Trade was risky in the following sense:
you’ve got something over which you have dominion, and you’re
considering trading it for something else that you might want more, but
which you might have a very small chance of actually getting in return for
what you relinquish.
For this reason, we can hypothesize that, throughout primate history
(indeed for the vast bulk of all organisms), natural selection will have
favored heritable predispositions to weigh the concrete present somewhat
more heavily than the theoretical future. It’s a bias towards presentism if
you will. And that’s probably an uncontroversial proposition (despite the
fact that there are going to be variations on the margin, especially within
big brained species like ourselves, chimpanzees, and the like).
TIME-SHIFTED RATIONALITY AND TIME HORIZONS
So how would a time-shifted rationality perspective on investor time
horizons proceed? It would first look for novel environmental features that
render some mismatch between what the brain is designed to do and what
we think the brain should be doing, if it truly understood its self-interest,
given those novel environmental features.
Let’s start with longer life. We live about double, at least, what we
used to live. And that change has come as quickly as an evolutionary eyeblink, as a function of such things as modernized medicine, and
efficiencies of domesticated foodstuffs, and the like. There is no reason to
think the brain is designed to maximize its own persistence of existence
over, say, an eighty or ninety-year period.
We also live with a suite of highly abstract things that never existed
before. Money, which has no value in itself, but which can be exchanged
for things of value. Virtual vaults, with infinite storage capacity, for that
money. Rights that extend beyond possession, for long periods. Tradable
rights, by which an abstraction, rather than a thing, can transfer from one
person to another. And highly systematized third-party enforcement
mechanisms—which enables us to now, as a novel environmental feature,
have tremendous confidence in enforceable trade agreements.
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Now you might be inclined to say: “That’s all well and good. But
how could you test such a thing?” I’m glad you asked. For roughly fifteen
years I’ve been engaged in some empirical work to test some predictions
of time-shifted rationality, as a way of pressing the approach. And I’ve
undertaken this in a context—involving the endowment effect—which is
for these purposes analogous to your concern about investor time horizons.
The endowment effect is the observable and seemingly irrational tendency
for people to demand far more, as a minimum payment to sell a thing they
have just acquired, than they would have been willing to pay, at maximum,
to acquire that same thing.15
Working together to investigate this, primatologist Sarah Brosnan
and I made three predictions. First, the effect is likely to be observable in
other species, including primate relatives. Why? Because a bird in the hand
is worth two in the bush. Natural selection will for this basic reason have
favored an initial inclination toward hanging on to what you have. The
same sort of logic applies in the time discounting context.
Second, the prevalence and magnitude of the endowment effect is
likely to vary across items. Why? To pick just one illustration, because
some items are highly abstract, while others are highly concrete. We have
a far deeper evolutionary history with the latter than with the former. And
there’s no reason to believe that our evolved valuation mechanisms, in our
neural machinery, treat objects and rights identically.
Third, the endowment effect will appear more frequently when
evolutionary salient items are at issue (i.e., those having a greater impact
on survival and reproductive success) compared to when less
evolutionarily salient items are at issue. That’s because the valuation
mechanism will deeper, more ancient, and (typically) stronger.
We tested these three predictions in a series of papers in chimpanzees
and orangutans—and became the first researchers to concretely
demonstrate a trade-based endowment effect in a non-human species, and
in patterns quite consistent with the predictions.16

15. Jones, Why Behavioral Economics, supra note 1; Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, &
Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193; Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Richard Thaler,
Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980); Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J.
ECON. 1039 (1991).
16. Sarah F. Brosnan et al., Endowment Effects in Chimpanzees, 17 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1704
(2007) [hereinafter Endowment Effects]; Sarah F. Brosnan et al., Evolution and the Expression of
Biases: Situational Value Changes the Endowment Effect in Chimpanzees, 33 EVOLUTION & HUM.
BEHAV. 378 (2012) [hereinafter Expression of Biases]; Timothy M. Flemming et al., The Endowment
Effect in Orangutans, 25 INT’L J. COMP. PSYCHOL. 285 (2012). Later work extended our experiments
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Our first experiment, with chimpanzees, illustrates the paradigm.17
Chimpanzees quite readily understand that they can exchange one thing
for another. And we tested our hypothesis by comparing trade behavior for
objects of very low evolutionary salience, toys, with trade behavior for
objects of high evolutionary salience, foods. We identified subject
preferences, first as between two toys, and later as between two foods, by
giving subjects the choice between two of the same category and recording
their choices. When offered the chance to trade a more preferred item for
a less-preferred item, chimpanzees—not surprisingly—generally retained
their more preferred item. That’s standard, rational behavior.
Contrastingly, we would count as evidence of the endowment effect any
time the subject refused to trade his or her less preferred item for the one
he or she preferred.
We had predicted that, when given the opportunity to express
preferences for one toy between two toys, and to later trade toys, there
would be very little endowment effect, and indeed there was. Only about
3% of our subjects exhibited it.
But we predicted the endowment effect would be much higher when
given the opportunity to trade foods. And in fact that’s exactly what we
found. In our first study, 42% of subjects refused to trade a less preferred
food for a more-preferred food. And that 42% is quite similar to the
expression of the endowment effect in humans. In other words, the
endowment effect within the category of foods was 14 times larger than it
is within the category of toys.
Note that we are not suggesting that chimpanzees prefer food to toys.
Of course they do. What we predicted and found instead is that, when
given the opportunity, chimpanzees are more likely to hang on to their less
preferred food when they could trade it for their more preferred food than
they are to hang on to their less preferred toy when they could trade it for
their more preferred toy.
No other extant theory makes this prediction. Of course, this
finding—even when repeated across other great apes—doesn’t mean
we’re necessarily right in our predictions about the origins of the
phenomenon. But we believe our series of papers, and particularly our
most recent one, provides some strongly corroborating evidence.
For our most recent paper,18 we wanted to make an even narrower
prediction. We wanted to see if we could essentially turn the endowment
effect up or down for the exact same item. More specifically, we thought
into gorillas. Lindsey A. Drayton et al., Endowment Effects in Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), 127 J. COMP.
PSYCHOL. 365 (2013).
17. Brosnan et al., Endowment Effects, supra note 16.
18. Brosnan et al., Expression of Biases, supra note 16.
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situational value would be relevant to the endowment effect. And therefore
we used tools that had no inherent use, but which would have use in
extracting food from containers when those containers of food were
present.
We tested the chimpanzees’ endowment effects for the tools in three
different (and of course counter-balanced) conditions: (1) food absent; (2)
food present but unreachable; and (3) food present and reachable.
In the first condition, the food absent condition, there was no
evidence of the endowment effect whatsoever. Zero. The same was true
when the food was in the room, but the subjects couldn’t reach it. But once
the food was in the room and subjects could reach it, a large endowment
effect came on-line. In this condition, subjects were much more likely to
hang on to their less preferred tool item when they could have traded it for
their more preferred tool item. In essence, in this condition, and in this
condition only, chimpanzees preferred to hang on to the tool in hand,
rather than to trade it for a more preferred tool that would have enabled
them to access more preferred food.
What’s the relevance of all this? Just to suggest that: (1) evolutionary
hypotheses about time-shifted rationality can be tested; (2) we have tested
some in the endowment effect context; and (3) the results are quite
consistent with the underlying theory. Meanwhile, no other theory makes
the same predictions or explains our results. So I think we’re onto
something here.
HOW THE BRAIN DISCOUNTS TIME
Back, now, to discounting time. How does the brain actually do it?
To address this subject, I’m going to have to spend a few minutes touching
very briefly on brain scanning methods—particularly why and how
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) works. And then I’ll
provide a very brief summary of what I understand researchers have so far
discovered about brain activity during temporal discounting.
There are today a number of neurotechnological capabilities that
enable us to study brain structure noninvasively.19 This is really
remarkable, when you think about it. We don’t have to cut people open, or
have them dead on a slab. We can peer into their brain tissue using x-rays
and learn something about what’s on the inside. Computed Tomography
19. For more detailed descriptions, see SCOTT A. HUETTEL, ALLEN W. SONG, & GREGORY
MCCARTHY, FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING (2d ed. 2008); OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY
D. SHALL, & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (2014), (see particularly Chapter 8: Brain
Monitoring and Manipulation); JURI D. KROPOTOV, QUANTITATIVE EEG, EVENT-RELATED
POTENTIALS AND NEUROTHERAPY (2009); STEVEN J. LUCK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EVENTRELATED POTENTIALTECHNIQUE (1st ed. 2005); MICHAEL J. POSNER & MARCUS E. RAICHLE, IMAGES
OF MIND (1997); OLAF SPORNS, NETWORKS OF THE BRAIN (1st ed. 2011).
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brain scans (also known as CT scans) are basically just x-rays in-theround, which are combined in the computer to provide navigable, threedimensional images. And Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), though
operating on different principles than x-rays, can also provide highresolution images of brain structure.
But of course we’re not just interested in the brain’s structure. If you
took an x-ray of your laptop, for example, you’d learn a lot about its
structure; but you’d learn very little about what it’s actually doing when
it’s doing things. So researchers have come up with a variety of techniques
to non-invasively investigate brain function.20 With ElectroEncephalography (EEG) you place a lot of electrodes on the scalp to
record electrical impulses of neurons in space and time. Positron Emission
Tomography (PET) uses radioactive tracers to track differential
metabolism in various areas of the brain, which enables an inference that
the areas of the brain most engaged in metabolic activity are the ones in
which neurons are working hardest on a given cognitive task.
But because many of the studies involving time-discounting in
humans use Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), I want to
spend just a little more time summarizing that technique. It works because
different cognitive tasks engage different suites of neurons in different
collaborations. The neurons that are working more consume more
resources, such as glucose and oxygen. And by a fortuitous coincidence of
nature, oxygenated and deoxygenated blood have different magnetic
properties.
Detecting variations across the brain, across time, in ratios of
oxygenated and deoxygenated blood, enables researchers to task the MRI
machine in ways that can discover correlations between the decisions that
people are making and inferred activity, of differing amplitudes, in
different regions of the brain, as people are making those decisions.
How does fMRI work? Suppose you have presented people with
scenarios to read while in the scanner, and have prompted those subjects
to indicate (typically with a button-box at their fingertips) a choice that is
responsive to the facts presented. Given that the researchers know when
the scenario was presented, what the scenario said, when the subject
responded, and what the subject’s choice was, you can—across many
different scenarios—begin to identify correlations between features in the
scenarios, behavioral outputs, and relative neural activity within different
brain regions.

20. A brief introduction to these techniques discussed over the next several paragraphs appears
in Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 5 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. (2009).
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The basic idea here is that you have coiled electrical wire in three
different planes that enable you to manipulate the features of the resulting
magnetic field with great precision. You insert a subject, whose subatomic
particles are normally all spinning about axes that are randomly distributed
in three dimensions. When spinning subatomic particles carry a charge,
they can be considered as very tiny magnets. And once those very tiny
magnets come within the magnetic field of the MRI machine, many of
their axes will align, just like filings on a piece of paper, held over a
standard magnet.
Then, while people are making decisions, you ping the brain with
radiofrequency waves. These knock many of those axes temporarily out
of their current alignment with the magnetic field. And when they snap
back into their aligned position, they release a little burst of energy that
can be detected and recorded with precision, both in space and in time. In
a nutshell, that’s how fMRI allows strong inferences about the correlations
between brain activity and particular kinds of decision making.
I should emphasize that I am not a trained neuroscientist, and that my
familiarity with this technique stems mainly from an opportunity I was
given by the MacArthur Foundation. The Foundation provided $7.6
million dollars in grant funding for me to design, populate, and direct a
national Research Network on Law and Neuroscience.21 That Network –
which has generated many dozens of publications over the last seven
years22—partners together a number of leading neuroscientists and leading
legal scholars at many of the country’s top universities, aided by judges as
well, to co-design experiments that I thought would be legally relevant and
useful, and then to execute those experiments in a very tight-knit,
collaborative way.
So how have these techniques been used to learn about time
discounting? First of all, researchers noticed a biochemical correlation
between lower cortisol hormone levels and larger time discounting. That
is, the most impulsive subjects—when given the choice between a sooner,
smaller reward and a later larger reward—are people who have low
cortisol in the brain.23
With respect to how the brain evaluates the sooner reward and later
reward options, that evaluation process appears to correlate with activity
21. The website of the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience,
which includes among other things a searchable and sortable database of all known neurolaw
publications, appears at http://www.lawneuro.org [https://perma.cc/GD9P-PM5B].
22. For a comprehensive list of publications authored or co-authored by a member of the
Research Network on Law and Neuroscience, visit http://www.lawneuro.org/publications.php
[https://perma.cc/42TM-3ZNF].
23. Taiki Takahashi, Cortisol Levels and Time-Discounting of Monetary Gain in Humans, 15
NEUROREPORT 2145 (2004).
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within a prefrontal cortex region, which is typically associated with
analytic reasoning.24 Now, here’s what’s interesting: How people are
calibrated with respect to impulsivity appears to correlate with activity in
a limbic region of the brain.25 The limbic areas of the brain are typically
considered to be evolutionarily old—more emotional if you will, and with
less cognitive and analytic capability than areas of the brain that evolved
much later. Lower prefrontal cortex activity and greater limbic activity
correlates with subjects biasing their choices toward the sooner, smaller
reward.
All this raises the hypothesis that there is some sort of a tension at
work, when one is making time-discounting decisions, between the more
analytic regions of the brain and the more emotional regions of the brain.
Interestingly, some researchers believe they have isolated and
distinguished the areas of the brain involved in evaluating the magnitude
of the offered rewards, on one hand, and the lengths of delay until one
would receive that reward, on the other.26 So, for example, variation in the
magnitude of respective awards appears to correlate with brain activity in
the nucleus accumbens, the medial prefrontal cortex, and the posterior
cingulate cortex—areas generally thought to be involved in reward
analysis, as well as in emotion and in memory.27
Interestingly, there’s some literature on predicting individual
discount rates from relative activity in two areas of the brain: the ventral
striatum and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex.28 In a nutshell, it appears
greater activity in these regions correlates with a greater preference for an
immediate reward over a delayed reward. Lessening activity in the ventral
striatum correlates with lowered likelihood to choose the sooner, smaller
reward.
I want to draw your attention to the ventral striatum here because, as
I said earlier, people aren’t really hardwired. There’s an interaction of
genes and environments all the time. And just to underscore that, let me
point out some cultural differences that have been identified in how human
brains discount time. In Americans, greater activity in the ventral striatum
is correlated with choosing the immediate reward over the delayed reward.
In contrast, it appears that in South Koreans, greater activity in the ventral
striatum is correlated with choosing the delayed reward over the
24. Anouk Scheres, Erik de Water, & Gabry W. Mies, The Neural Correlates of Temporal
Reward Discounting, 4 WIRES COGNITIVE SCI. 523 (2013).
25. Id.
26. Kacey Ballard & Brian Knutson, Dissociable Neural Representations of Future Reward
Magnitude and Delay During Temporal Discounting, 45 NEUROIMAGE 143 (2009).
27. Id.
28. Nicole Cooper et al., Brain Activity in Valuation Regions While Thinking About the Future
Predicts Individual Discount Rates, 33 J. NEUROSCI. 13150 (2013).
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immediate one.29 These findings suggest there may be some important
differences in environmental influences—such as education, cultural
norms, and the like—that affect the ways members of the two cultures
make time-discounting decisions.
I should mention that although researchers seem to agree that all
these studies I’ve discussed so far are robust, they have disagreements
about what it all may mean. There are at least three different models of
how these brain regions are involved and why. A review article on the
subject suggests that each of the models has some evidence and support.30
Which is to say: brain scan investigations into time-discounting
decisions are very much a work in progress. We don’t know where it’s all
going to lead. But what I want you to take away at the moment is that brain
researchers are working on and identifying the brains circuitries that
appear to be involved in the tension between choosing the sooner, smaller
reward and choosing the larger, latter reward. And at the moment it
appears that the two regions in question are likely to be the ones that are
considered to be engaged in more analytic processing about the more
abstract return in the future, on one hand, and more limbic or emotional
processing about the more immediate reward that will be more
immediately gratifying, on the other. It is not surprising that the tension
we know people experience has manifestations in the brain. Where else
would it manifest? But what is surprising is the extent to which researchers
are making progress on identifying common-pattern brain circuitries in
human subjects that correlate with particularized elements of these timediscounting decisions.
PROSPECTS FOR CONSILIENCE
Before closing, let me spend a moment talking about prospects for
consilience. Here is the major problem confronting a deep understanding
of investor time horizons, in a nutshell. There are multiple disciplines
focusing on the same fundamental puzzle, but from quite different
perspectives.
What we wind up with—as with the story of the blind men and the
elephant—is that each discipline focuses on the part of the problem that it
sees or touches. So, those that touch the trunk think an elephant is like a
snake. Those who touch the leg think an elephant is like a tree, and so on.
The key challenge, of course, is that reality doesn’t come with problems
that are neatly packaged, wrapped with a bow, and tidily delivered to only
one department in a university. There’s just a reality, an elephant, and it’s
29. Bokyung Kim, Young Shin Sung, & Samuel M. McClure, The Neural Basis of Cultural
Differences in Delay Discounting, 367 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 650, 653 (2012).
30. Scheres, Water, & Mies, supra note 24.
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out there, still to be understood. And the difference between one
department’s conception of reality and what reality is, is where we
encounter our largest challenges. The less we understand the reality of,
say, investor time horizon behavior, the less capable we are of addressing
it, shaping it, guiding it, and, at times, counteracting it.
In this respect, we need to acknowledge that William Whewell, who
by the way gave us the word “scientist,” also gave us the less popular but
crucially important word “consilience.” Consilience is the unification of
knowledge between the different branches of learning.
In theory, all the fields within behavioral biology should all be
consilient. They are not, yet, in large part because there are still major
differences in vocabulary and methods among these fields. But, even more
importantly, we have a broader set of behavioral sciences—encompassing
psychology, economics, and the like—that ideally all need to be pulled
together at the same table with behavioral biology to address behavioral
problems of any particular import.
How might one actually accomplish this? In a forthcoming chapter31
I argue that it’s not enough to identify a general phenomenon to
investigate—such as, say, the existence of bounded rationality, cognitive
heuristics, and biases. And it’s not enough to identify a specific subset of
the phenomenon to investigate—such as oddities in investor time
horizons. It is essential to separate, in a very self-conscious and selfdisciplined way, the different categories of questions that will guide the
initial components of the inquiry.
As already alluded to earlier, people too often confound, when
investigating psychological phenomena, questions about why a behavioral
predisposition exists and questions about how it comes to manifest, and
sometimes to vary, in the ways it does. Put another way, it is common to
think that discovering details on the relevant mechanisms, the factors that
cause a phenomenon to manifest, is to be answering, in some fundamental
way, a “why” question. Typically it is not. In the same way that providing
details on the effects of song sparrow hormones on its brain doesn’t really
answer the question: Why does that sparrow sing in the spring? To identify
environmental features that increase or decrease the probability that a
phenomenon will manifest is to provide value, surely. But it should not be
thought to answer satisfactorily the deeper and often more important
question: Why do those factors tend to manifest in this particular
phenomenon, rather than in other phenomena? That is, it generally
provides little meaningful traction on the question of why the
phenomenon, such as temporal discounting, exists in the first place.
31. Jones, Why Behavioral Economics, supra note 1.
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So, the why questions must be rigorously separated from the how
questions. Such as: How does the phenomenon manifest? In whom does it
manifest differently? Where across the globe are there variations in
manifestation? And under what circumstances? And the presence of what
factors increases the probability of a person’s choosing a sooner, smaller
reward over a later and larger one?
Once you’ve got the categories of questions quite clearly separated,
you can then work in a systematic way to try to integrate the findings of
relevant fields within each category of question. So, for example,
neuroscientists and economists can get together (as they have begun doing,
in recent years) and try to focus on the pathways by which temporal
discounting takes place, and the contexts in which anomalies arise. The
two fields working together figure out where the incompatibilities are
between their respective understandings, and set up experiments to grind
out the differences between those empirically. You come up with
experiments that test which is right, and then you move on from there,
trying to make knowledge within the how question domain as consilient
as possible.
Thereafter, you attempt to unify the cross-consilient answers to the
how question with the cross-consilient answers to the why question—in
furtherance, of course, of some grand synthesis between the two. One that
would be more empirically grounded, and more likely to be closer to right.
I am, of course, not suggesting this is easy. In fact, in my experience
getting different disciplines to work together is far harder than letting them
go about their merry ways, even if they are interested in the same
phenomena. But I am suggesting that if we don’t seek consilience in a very
methodological way we are doomed to do what we’ve always done, which
is just further and further and further subdivide our disciplines. All while
seeing smaller and smaller and smaller parts of the elephant.
CONCLUSION
Let me end with several takeaways. All decisions emanate from
evolved brains, which natural selection has equipped with various
cognitive behavioral predispositions. Importantly, those are generally
tailored to deep ancestral, rather than modern, environments. You can’t
expect the Ferrari, which is very well designed to travel a paved road, to
climb logs effectively when you take it off road. A poorly performing offroad Ferrari isn’t defective. It is simply mismatched to the immediate
environmental demands, for which it wasn’t designed. We must consider
that sometimes our brain is that Ferrari, being evaluated on its puzzlingly
poor off-road performance.
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Temporal discounting, like all cognitive phenomena, has both
ultimate and proximate causes. The ultimate causes are likely that
temporal discounting was historically superior to its opposite, given the
asymmetric risks across evolutionary time of consuming versus deferring
consumption. This suggests that quirks in temporal discounting that we
see today likely arise partly because of time-shifted rationality, i.e., the
mismatch of brains that are sometimes better-adapted to long-ago
environments than they are to novel environments.
In terms of proximate causation, time-discounting choices are likely
effected by brain activity that involves both analytic and emotional
regions. And the choices people make likely reflect the net of the activities
in those regions, in tension with one another. A net that, evidence suggests,
may be somewhat modifiable by learning, across the lifespan.
Finally, we need greater consilience—among all the disciplines that
bear on time-discounting decisions—in order to drive new insights into
investor time horizons.
With that extremely quick overview of some pieces of the brain
sciences that may be relevant to your inquiry, I’ll stop there and take
questions. Thank you.

